Route Diagnostics
A key method of supporting analysis is the use of route diagnostics to determine the constraints to flows in trade and logistics.
The team has considerable experience in conducting such diagnostics since 2008, in a variety of settings, viz:
Mombasa-Rwanda,
Nairobi-Mombasa (on the ‘lunatic express’),
Nairobi-Mombasa (on the Standard Guage Railway),
Kapiri Mposhi-Dar-es-Salaam (on the Tazara train),
Pakistan/Spin Boldak-Kandahar and Helmand (on fuel tankers and jingly trucks),
Jalalabad-Tarin Kowt road,
Johannesburg-Kasumbalesa,
Johannesburg-Mozambique-Malawi-Mozambique-Zim-Botswana-Namibia-Joburg,
Joburg-Botswana-Zambia-Mongu-DRC-Lusaka-Caprivi-Walvis-Cape Town.
This method enables insight into the realities of routes, customs and immigration systems, and where blockages exist, whether this be in terms of human software or infrastructural hardware. This can help to guide reform efforts, as in the case of Zambia, which directly contributed to the case for a PPP on the Western highway, construction on which started in 2025. The Afghan diagnostics contributed to a different perspective on the role of warlords in the local political economy, as noted by General Sir Nick Carter in the citation below:
‘During 2010 at the height of President Obama’s Afghanistan surge I was a Major General commanding Regional Command South, covering Kandahar and Helmand amongst other provinces. This was a phenomenally dangerous time. A resurgent Taliban was on the offensive. My task, utilising 55,000 NATO troops and 30,000 Afghan security forces, was to take the fight to the insurgency, stabilise the area, and connect the Afghan population to effective governance.
As part of a broader strategy, I was particularly interested in getting after the many causes of the insurgency not simply the insurgency itself. An important one of these was the absence of freedom of movement for the population on the major highways where illegal check points and corrupt police check points were often established. Corruption and the lack of freedom of movement prevented economic development and the delivery of basic governance, and above all it undermined the confidence of the population, driving many of them into the hands of the Taliban insurgency.
This phenomenon was particularly evident on the strategic highway that linked Pakistan to Kandahar via the crossing at Spin Baldak. This highway was fundamental to economy, not least for the customs revenue it could potentially generate. Despite being supported by a massive intelligence effort, we lacked basic human intelligence on the nature of this problem.
At this point Dr Mills came forward and volunteered with a US special forces operative to go under cover. Together they approached an indigenous truck at the frontier crossing point at Spin Baldak and drove in the truck to Kandahar to gain an understanding of the problem. Not only was this very courageous – particularly given the lack of military support that could be brought to bear in the event of them encountering a problem at the numerous illegal and quasi police check points they encountered – it was also enormously helpful in our subsequent targeting of corruption.
Dr Mills must be recognised for his phenomenally courageous contribution to the campaign.’
General Sir Nick Carter, Former Chief of the Defence Staff